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The Social Relations of Consumption: Corporate Law
and the Meaning of Consumer Culture
David G. Yosifon*
ABSTRACT
A mature assessment of the society we are making for ourselves,
and the legacy we are leaving to the future, must come to terms with
consumer culture. Theoretical discourse, as well as common experience,
betray persistent ambiguity about what consumerism means to and says
about us. In this Article, I argue that this ambiguity can in part be
explained by examining the social relations of consumption in
contemporary society. These involve, crucially, the relationship between
producer and consumer that is dictated by corporate governance law,
and embodied in the decision-making dynamics of the directors who
command corporate operations. The enigmatic nature of consumer
culture can be understood as resulting from a lack of integrity in the
social relations between corporations and consumers. Having made this
diagnosis, I argue that the character of our consumer culture can be
improved by introducing greater sincerity into the social relations of
consumption. These concerns contribute to a broader set of arguments
for reforming corporate governance law to require corporate directors
to attend to the interests of multiple stakeholders in corporate decisionmaking, and not just the interests of shareholders. Regardless of
whether one embraces this prescription, the analysis developed here can
enrich our understanding of what is at stake in debates about our
corporate law.

* Associate Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law. Dyosifon@scu.edu. I would like
to thank Mary Sexton for her expert assistance in obtaining research materials. My thanks to
Stephen Diamond, Pratheepan Gulasekaram, David Ball, William Woodward, Tyler Ochoa,
Michelle Oberman, David Sloss, and Stephen Yosifon for comments on an earlier draft. I am
indebted to James Livingston, John Gillis, Scott Sandage, Peter Stearns, and Jon Hanson for
their influence on my thinking about these issues. Any insight here is owed to them. All errors
are mine alone.
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“There is something in the structure of the human animal which
compels him to produce superfluously.”

Norman O. Brown 1
“To ignore it is to court nostalgia. To engage with it, however, is
to risk . . . mak[ing] the same point over and over: technological
consumerism is an infernal machine, technological consumerism is
an infernal machine.”

Jonathan Franzen 2
I. INTRODUCTION
Consumer culture is a defining feature of modern life. It is also a
cardinal normative concern. Understanding what consumerism
“means” is essential to a mature assessment of the society we are
making for ourselves, and the legacy we are leaving to the future.
Mainstream economists and policymakers perennially insist that

1.

NORMAN O. BROWN, LIFE AGAINST DEATH: THE PSYCHOANALYTICAL MEANING
256 (1959).
2. Jonathan Franzen, Perchance to Dream: In the Age of Images, A Reason to Write
Novels, HARPER’S, Apr. 1996, at 35, 43.

OF HISTORY
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consumption must be encouraged in order to fuel development and
ensure prosperity. 3 Yet there is persistent ambiguity in theoretical
discourse, and common experience, about the meaning of our
consumer culture. In this Article, I argue that this ambiguity can, in
part, be explained by examining the social relations of consumption
in contemporary society. These social relations involve, crucially, the
relationship between producer and consumer that is dictated by
corporate governance law, and embodied in the decision-making
dynamics of the directors who command corporate operations. The
enigmatic nature of consumer culture can be understood, to some
useful extent, as resulting from a lack of integrity in the social
relations between corporations and consumers.
If our consumer culture is (partially) a function of the social
relations of consumption, then perhaps we can improve the character
of that culture by introducing greater integrity into those social
relations. This can be accomplished through the reform of corporate
law. Specifically, I claim that legitimate concerns about consumer
culture contribute to a broader set of arguments for reforming
corporate governance law to require corporate directors to attend to
the interests of multiple stakeholders in corporate decision-making,
and not just the interests of shareholders. Regardless of whether one
embraces this prescription, the analysis developed here can enrich
our understanding of what is at stake in debates about our corporate
law: what it is, what it does, and what it might do.
Groucho Marx once said, “When I hear the word culture I reach
for my wallet.” 4 Legal scholars, too, seem to worry that cultural
analysis will operate as the pretty ruse of a theoretical pick-pocket,
leaving us dazzled, perhaps, but poorer in understanding than when
we started out. The conventional categories of legal analysis favor
inquiries that are plainly tractable, even quantifiable. This is
3. See infra text accompanying notes 21−23 (describing the role that the “Keynesian
consensus” plays in conventional economic and policymaking discourse).
4. Peter Borsay & Callum Brown, Review of Books, 22 URBAN HISTORY 139, 139
(1995) (quoting Groucho Marx). Groucho’s quip was a variation on the line attributed to the
Nazi leader Hermann H. Goering: “Whenever I hear the word culture, I reach for my
revolver.” The Goering quote is apparently apocryphal. See PAUL F. BOLLER, JR. & JOHN
GEORGE, THEY NEVER SAID IT: A BOOK OF FAKE QUOTES, MISQUOTES, AND MISLEADING
ATTRIBUTIONS 36 (1989) (“This statement actually . . . comes from Hanns Johst’s drama
Schlageter, produced at the State Playhouse in Berlin in 1933.”). It is conceivable that Goering
was familiar with the Johst play and used the line himself.
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motivated by an estimable desire to get at the usable knowledge that
objective, quasi-scientific approaches promise. It is also driven by a
scrupulous commitment to avoiding methods that risk illiberally
celebrating or condemning particular values or ways of life, which
cultural analysis might seem to imply. 5
Mainstream corporate law scholarship exemplifies this tendency.
It has principally been concerned with analyzing the shareholder
predicament in corporate affairs, construed in terms of financial risk
and return. “Progressive” or critical corporate law scholarship looks
beyond the shareholder’s stake in corporate operations, but also has
largely eschewed cultural assessment, tethering its analysis instead to
countable versions of corporate “harm” such as environmental
externalities, declining wages, or tobacco-related deaths. 6 Even
cutting-edge scholarship marshaling the insights of social psychology
for corporate law study has restricted its attention to categories that
are at least in principle measurable, such as “consumer risk
perception.” 7 The insights supplied by these scholarly tranches are
crucial, but they leave out of the conversation an important aspect of
what we want to talk about when we talk about corporations. It lets
pass, and thus gives a pass to, the cultural significance of corporate
law, particularly as it relates to consumerism. This Article is
concerned with developing a way of thinking about consumer
culture within corporate law discourse.
The great anthropologist Clifford Geertz defined “culture” in
straightforward, encompassing terms, as “a system of inherited
conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men
5. See Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115 (2007)
(examining the psychological limits of liberalism). The exception is that corporate law scholars
have given some attention to the culture of the corporate boardroom. See, e.g., STEPHEN
BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 77–104
(2008) (exploring the utility of boardroom culture as a means of encouraging directors to
work honestly and effectively). Examination of this culture, however, has been for the purpose
of understanding how firms act or fail to act in the shareholder interest, without any study of
the general cultural implications of that activity.
6. See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some
Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1467–1552 (1999) [hereinafter
Hanson & Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously] (arguing that profit-maximizing tobacco
companies exploited psychological vulnerabilities of tobacco consumers for decades, in ways
that conventional economic and legal analysis were unprepared to assess).
7. See David G. Yosifon, Legal Theoretic Inadequacy and Obesity Epidemic Analysis, 15
GEO. MASON L. REV. 681 (2008) (reviewing scholarship of this sort).
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[and women] communicate, perpetuate, and develop their
knowledge about and attitudes toward life.” 8 My focus on
“consumer culture” is an effort to consider what our consumerism
means to us and what it says about us, as individuals and as a society.
I do not explore here the content of consumer culture. I will not
assess particular discourses on sex, gender, race, or class occasioned
by consumer culture generally, or through particular consumer
cultures of smoking, electronics, or fast food. 9 That sort of work is
fascinating, and sometimes even credible, but here I am trying to
characterize consumer culture at a more general level of abstraction,
and from a particular vantage. I am concerned with the process
through which consumer culture comes into being. Specifically, I am
concerned with the way that corporate law shapes the social relations
of consumption, and thus, shapes consumer culture.
The Article is organized as follows. Part II describes the
fundamentally ambiguous, or ambivalent, depiction of consumer
culture that emerges from those intellectual traditions that have
intensely grappled with it. Part III critiques the scant and undertheorized role that assessment of consumer culture has played within
corporate law scholarship. Part IV examines the social relations of
consumption as they are described by contemporary corporate
governance law, and embodied in the decision-making dynamics of
corporate boards of directors. My claim is that the problem of
“insincerity” described in Part IV must be understood as an essential
component of the social relations of consumption in our society, and
thus as central to the meaning of consumer culture. Part V describes
a reform program that aims to make corporate decision-making
more sincere, which, among other benefits, may give consumer
culture more integrity, and make the meaning of consumer culture
less ambiguous. Part VI gives a brief conclusion.

8. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Religion as a Cultural System, in THE INTERPRETATION OF
CULTURES 87, 89 (1973).
9. But see infra text accompanying notes 18−20 (noting scholarship on the
relationship between consumerism and landmark civil rights movements pursuing racial,
gender, and sexual orientation equality).
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II. THE AMBIVALENT MEANING OF CONSUMER CULTURE
While mainstream corporate law scholars have not struggled with
consumer culture, intellectuals in other disciplines have evaluated it
with interest, and usually skepticism. A robust tradition in academic
cultural history explains the emergence of consumerism in what
might generally be called “functionalist” terms. Mass consumerism
emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as a
reliable means of channeling a wide range of human desires in an
efficient, predictable manner that was compatible with the
formalized, sanitized way of life emerging under corporate
capitalism. 10 For the working-class, consumerism became a
compensatory salve for the ignominy of industrialized labor. For the
wealthy, conspicuous consumption became a way of grappling with
status anxiety in a world with unprecedented social mobility. 11 For
American culture as a whole, consumer culture in the twentieth
century became a central organizing principle of individual and
associational identity, replacing the centrality of the worker and civicminded ethic that had theretofore dominated the American scene. 12
Cultural analysts have been spooked by consumer culture from
the beginning. Consumer culture, many have said, sterilizes and
homogenizes the otherwise messy but sublime human condition. It
promises transcendence but it does not deliver. Instead, it sets us
back. This long-standing critical tradition can be traced at least to
William Wordsworth—“Getting and spending, we lay waste our
powers . . . / We have given our hearts away, a sordid boon!” 13—and
has echoed in American letters from Thorstein Veblen to Bob Dylan,
10. See, e.g., COLIN CAMPBELL, THE ROMANTIC ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF MODERN
CONSUMERISM (1987); T.J. JACKSON LEARS, NO PLACE OF GRACE: ANTIMODERNISM AND
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE 1880-1920 (1981); PETER N. STEARNS,
AMERICAN COOL: CONSTRUCTING A TWENTIETH-CENTURY EMOTIONAL STYLE 209–
14 (1994).
11. See THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS (1899).
12. See Richard Wightman Fox & T.J. Jackson Lears, Introduction to THE CULTURE
OF CONSUMPTION: CRITICAL ESSAYS IN AMERICAN HISTORY, 1880-1890, at vii (Richard
Wightman Fox & T.J. Jackson Lears eds., 1983); STEPHEN NISSENBAUM, THE BATTLE FOR
CHRISTMAS 139 (1996) (arguing that “[c]onsumer capitalism and civic virtue were not
commonly associated with each other in early nineteenth-century America,” but the
emergence of the modern Christmas rituals “helped intensify and legitimize a commercial kind
of consumerism”).
13. William Wordsworth, The World Is Too Much with Us, in POEMS 122 (1807).
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the latter of whom warned that: “advertising signs they con / You
into thinking you’re the one / That can do what’s never been done
/ That can win what’s never been won / Meantime life outside goes
on / All around you.” 14 Consumer culture, on this reading, is
manipulative and degrading. 15
The most strident critics of consumerism claim that the situation
is worse than what Dylan described. It is not so much that consumer
culture keeps you from the life that is going on all around you—the
fact is, according to the most mournful tally, there is no longer any
real life going on anywhere other than the shadow, shallow life of
consumerism. These people say things like: “All that once was
directly lived has become mere representation.” 16 The domination of
consumer culture empties out and replaces other forms of meaning
from social life, in particular, meanings that previously were made in
community, politics, and religion. 17
However, a different tradition of cultural studies celebrates
consumer culture as a highly effective vehicle of personal and social
liberation. Personal liberation, because consumerism allows
individuals an accessible means of escape from the narrow terms of
identity otherwise provided only by stultifying tradition or work.
Social liberation, because consumer culture became a crucial site of
various civil rights movements. Consumer goods have literally
created and carried the message of equality, quintessentially through

14. BOB DYLAN, It’s Alright, Ma (I’m Only Bleeding), on BRINGING IT ALL BACK
HOME (Columbia 1965). Of course, Dylan here commoditizes the con of the
commoditization of difference. This does not dispel but rather more deeply demonstrates the
infinite loop of commoditization on which the critics of consumerism dwell, and despair. See
also VEBLEN, supra note 11.
15. Even as we can locate criticism of “consumerism” as a distinctly historical
phenomena, we can also see it as a more-or-less universal feature of reflection on the human
condition. Wordsworth’s lament about our “sordid boon” was written in 1807, long before
the rise of large corporations or modern consumer culture in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. We could probably make biographical arguments about Wordsworth being
at the vanguard of a bourgeoning cultural phenomenon, but truly we could also surely find
expressions like this offered by sensitive thinkers since we first climbed down from the trees, or
at least since we started planting the beer. The issue I am pursuing here is what our
institutional arrangements do, in particular what corporate law does, to exacerbate, mitigate,
enliven, subdue, rectify, or improve this eternal aspect of the human condition.
16. GUY DEBORD, THE SOCIETY OF THE SPECTACLE 12 (Donald Nicholson-Smith
trans., Zone Books 1999) (1967).
17. See id. at 12–14.
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music, but also through books, movies, and television. This
happened in the United States in the middle decades of the
twentieth century, and at the end of the twentieth century it gave
shape to the “velvet revolution” in the Soviet bloc, where the desire
for consumer culture forced political change. 18 Consumerism may be
a somewhat vapid or fleeting approach to identity, but its
superficiality replaces otherwise pernicious, oppressive, and
ultimately, boring discourses on identity that draw their authority
from racism, sexism, classicism, and hetero-normativity. 19 Consumer
culture expands the possibilities of not just material pleasures, but
also our inner life. Advertising is testimony to our abundance—
personal and social. The acolytes of this tradition insist, contra
Dylan, that, far from being a con, advertising is “the last
utopian idiom.” 20
In a sense, everything depends upon which of these
interpretations of consumer culture, the condemning or the
celebratory, is right. What seems to be at stake is, in the words of
James Livingston, “whether emotional frugality or expenditure is the
proper structure of [our] souls.” 21 At stake too is the attitude that we
should have, skeptical or celebratory, to recurring, mainstream
macro-economic and political claims about the importance of
consumption activity, and the imperative of encouraging ever-greater
levels of consumption, in order to ensure economic development
and political stability. 22 Whether this “Keynesian consensus” is good

18. See generally LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMERS’ REPUBLIC: THE POLITICS OF
MASS CONSUMPTION IN POSTWAR AMERICA (2003); see also Elisa Glick, The Dialectics of
Dandyism, 48 CULTURAL CRITIQUE 129–30 (2001) (emphasizing the role of consumer
culture in both identity formation and political engagement in the gay rights movement).
19. See generally DEIRDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, THE BOURGEOIS VIRTUES: ETHICS FOR AN
AGE OF COMMERCE 25–26 (2006) (emphasizing the bleak and oppressive nature of cultural
life for the vast majority of people in the pre-modern era).
20. JAMES LIVINGSTON, AGAINST THRIFT: WHY CONSUMER CULTURE IS GOOD FOR
THE ECONOMY, THE ENVIRONMENT, AND YOUR SOUL 115−16 (2011) [hereinafter
LIVINGSTON, AGAINST THRIFT] (“Could advertising be the thesaurus of our real feelings, the
indispensable, vernacular language we use to plot our positions on the emotional atlas that is
everyday life?”).
21. Id. at xiii.
22. The Keynesian outlook emphasizes the urgency of encouraging consumption. This
is because consumers have a propensity to increase consumption when their income increases,
but not by as much as their income is increased. Keynes called this “a fundamental
psychological law.” JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT,
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economics is beyond the present inquiry. 23 My point is rather to
draw critical attention to the relentless, uncritical emphasis that the
consensus outlook places on spurring consumer demand. We must
know what to make of such consumption, and what it is making
of us.
III. THE ABSENCE OF CONSUMER CULTURE IN CORPORATE
THEORY
Critical assessment of consumerism has not been a feature of
traditional corporate law scholarship. The focus of the field has
instead been on one important problem in the social relations of
production under corporate capitalism: the separation of ownership
and control in enterprise. The problems inherent to this mode of
organization have been evident at least since Adam Smith wrote the
following in The Wealth of Nations:
The trade of a joint stock company is always managed by a court
[think board] of directors. This court . . . [is] subject, in many
respects, to the control of a general court of proprietors [think
shareholders]. But the greater part of those proprietors seldom
pretend to understand anything of the business of the company
[think
rational
ignorance] . . . . The
directors
of
such
companies . . . being the managers rather of other people’s money
than of their own, it cannot well be expected that they should
watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the

INTEREST, AND MONEY 96 (First Harbinger ed., 1964). This consumer habit becomes a core
element in “Keynesianism.” Because consumers save a greater portion of their income, demand
will ultimately be insufficient to justify productive investment of capital. This under-investment
means under-employment. Workers seeking to provide for their own future consumption
refuse to supply the current demand sufficient to justify the current investment that would
employ them. This creates a “liquidity trap” or a “savings glut” in which consumers are
unwilling to spend their earnings and business is unwilling to invest in productive activity.
Under such conditions, Keynesianism calls on policymakers to take steps to
encourage consumption.
23. The familiar motto, “We are all Keynesians now,” is quasi-apocryphally attributed
to Milton Friedman, who was quoted to that effect in a Time Magazine cover story in 1965.
We Are All Keynesians Now, TIME, Dec. 31, 1965, at 74. Friedman, however, insisted that
what he actually said was, “In one sense, we are all Keynesians now; in another, nobody is any
longer a Keynesian.” See Milton Friedman, Letter to the Editor, TIME, Feb. 4, 1966, at 15. I
am not focused here on proving the universality of Keynesianism. It is enough for present
purposes to assert that this is a widespread view in both formal economics and
ordinary politics.
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partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their
own . . . . Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail,
more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company
[the agency problem]. 24

This shareholder agency problem has continually commanded
the attention of corporate law scholars. Its modern statement is
pinned to Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means’ totemic The Modern
Corporation and Private Property, published in 1932, and its
“formalization” credited to Michael Jensen and William Meckling’s
Theory of the Firm article in 1976. 25 Every year, still, the law reviews
are filled with studies and arguments treating the problem with evergreater nuance.
To properly characterize consumer culture, we must begin close
to this canonical starting place. The corporate reorganization of the
economy that separated ownership and control in production also
introduced new social relations of consumption, by separating
production and consumption. This disaggregation created a
consumer agency problem that has received little attention by
scholars. Before the mid-nineteenth century, most business activity
was organized through familial relationships, and most of what was
consumed was produced by relatives or neighbors. 26 Where
consumers produce for themselves or in affective associational
arrangements, such as family or kin networks, the interests of
24. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 849 (London, Methuen & Co., 1904)
(1776). As with Wordsworth, see supra note 13, Smith’s writing could be seen as prescient, as
he was describing a social problem that would not become widespread, or appreciated as
widespread, until several generations after he lived. In another sense, however, again as with
Wordsworth, Smith is describing a problem that has been with humankind in all epochs,
whenever some have purported to work on behalf of others. My focus is on the particular
challenges presented by these universal human predicaments in our time, in our systems, and
within our corporate law. See JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE
COMPANY: A SHORT HISTORY OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA (2003) (tracing agency problems
in business operations back at least to Ancient Egypt).
25. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
26. See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 17 (1977) (asserting that “the family remained the
basic business unit” well into the nineteenth century); see also Christopher Clark, Household
Economy, Market Exchange and the Rise of Capitalism in the Connecticut Valley, 1800-1860, 12
J. SOC. HIST. 169, 173 (1973) (describing “networks of exchange relationships . . . [among]
neighbors and relatives” that formed the basis of consumption patterns for rural families in the
early nineteenth century).
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production and consumption are aligned. 27 The problem is that
under such “primitive” modes of economic organization, relatively
little is produced or consumed, and the ravages of depravation are
more threatening than the depravities of abundance.
The corporate organization of production introduced new social
relations of consumption. Now the consumer stood at arms-length
from the hand that would feed, clothe, and delight her, and the
“morals of the market place,” 28 rather than those of hearth or
neighborhood, described the atmosphere of exchange. When, as
under corporate capitalism, production and consumption are so
separated, “it cannot be well expected,” 29 to borrow Adam Smith’s
verbiage, that corporate directors “will watch over [consumer
interests] with the same anxious vigilance” 30 with which consumers
would watch over it themselves. We should anticipate that
“negligence and profusion” regarding the “affairs” of consumers
“must always prevail” in corporate operations. 31 Yet this consumer
agency problem has rarely been identified, and has never been
pursued with the academic doggedness that has served the
shareholder agency problem. 32
Canonical corporate theory compounds its error of ignoring the
consumer agency problem when it insists that solving the allegedly
all-important shareholder agency problem requires shareholder
primacy in corporate governance. In an effort to mitigate
“negligence and profusion,” 33 the law binds corporate directors with
the yoke of fiduciary obligation to the shareholders. So charged, and

27. Cf. Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 733, 749−59 (2005) (describing operational discretion in the operation of small, noncorporate businesses). Elhauge argues that corporate managers have a similar latitude to
engage in operational restraint. He is wrong about that as a matter of positive law. See David
G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L. REV. 181, 200–03 (2013),
but the idea is useful when considering a reform program. See infra Part V.
28. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, J.) (contrasting
the moral expectations “trodden by the crowd” with those expected of a fiduciary).
29. See SMITH, supra note 24, at 849.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See David G. Yosifon, The Consumer Interest in Corporate Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS. L.
REV. 253 (2009) (analyzing and critiquing the role of the consumer in dominant
corporate theory).
33. See SMITH, supra note 24, at 849.
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operating in a broader economic and cultural context that deepens
their fealty to shareholders, directors are moved to search for profits
wherever they might be found, including, where possible, by
manipulating non-shareholders, including consumers. Adam Smith
was not as impressed with this problem as he was the shareholder
agency problem:
The prejudices of some political writers against shopkeepers and
tradesmen are altogether without foundation . . . . Some of them,
perhaps, may sometimes decoy a weak customer to buy what he has
no occasion for. This evil, however, is of too little importance to
deserve the public attention . . . . It is not the multitude of
alehouses, to give the most suspicious example, that occasions a
general disposition to drunkenness among the common people;
but that disposition, arising from other causes, necessarily gives
employment to a multitude of alehouses. 34

Corporations generate profits by discerning and serving
consumer “disposition[s],” not by “decoy[ing]” them. 35 Whatever
meaning there is in consumer culture depends entirely on the
consumer. And this too has been the position taken by Smith’s
modern heirs in corporate law scholarship, down again to Michael
Jensen, Oliver Williamson, or Stephen Bainbridge. 36
One early twentieth-century economist did come close to
formulating the consumer predicament in the agency-problem terms
that I am urging. In his 1923 book, The Control of Industry, Dennis
Robertson (a mentor to Ronald Coase) dedicated a chapter to
examining “Industry and the Consumer.” 37 Robertson cataloged
“the grievances, real or imaginary,” of consumers under the capitalist

34. SMITH, supra note 24, at 407. Here we see already, in Smith, a prejudice that
continues to haunt corporate law discourse. Analysts who deal with shareholder exploitation
get the neutral title “economist,” while those who address the consumer predicament are
maligned as “political writers.” Id.
35. See id.
36. See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 25; OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985); BAINBRIDGE, supra note 5.
37. Robertson’s book furnished the line quoted and made famous by Coase, comparing
corporations to “islands of conscious power in this ocean of unconscious co-operation, like
lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of buttermilk.” D. H. ROBERTSON, THE CONTROL OF
INDUSTRY 84 (1923), quoted in R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386,
388 (1937).
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system. 38 He includes familiar protests against advertisers who
“[f]rom every hoarding and newspaper . . . explain vociferously to
the consumer what he wants, until he almost—but not quite—comes
to believe that it is true,” 39 among other complaints. 40 Robertson
reviews prevailing (then and now) solutions to these problems, most
of which involve the palliatives of general welfare legislation. 41
Hitting on the consumer agency problem formulation, Robertson
writes that such remedies, “all embody, in one form or another, the
ambitious notion of undoing the great division of function which
first took place when Eve picked the apple and Adam ate it, and
reintegrating the consumer with the producer.” 42
There was promise in Robertson’s image, but he did not quite
see it. There may have been a division of labor between Adam and
Eve, but there was no agency problem as such. As spouses, their
well-being was inextricably intertwined. 43 There is no tension or
division of interests between production and consumption where the
functions are separated under such affective conditions. Eve has no
incentive to malinger or thieve, since any harm that comes to Adam
from bad fruit is suffered by her too. Love aligns their interests
better than any stock option plan could hope to. It is true that Eve
faltered in her production responsibilities, and that Adam bears the
burden of her lapse when he consumes. 44 They are both expelled
from Paradise. But there is a difference between what it means to
lose Paradise through manipulation or indifference, and what it
means to lose it through loving incompetence. She meant well. 45 The
social relations attending the consumption are crucial to
characterizing its meaning, its significance, and the world that the

38. Id. at 101.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 101–03.
41. Id. at 103. But see infra text accompanying notes 104–09 (criticizing the view that
corporate abuses can be effectively policed through general welfare legislation).
42. ROBERTSON, supra note 37, at 103.
43. “Therefore shall a man [or woman] . . . cleave unto his [or her] wife [or husband]:
and they shall be one flesh.” Genesis 2:24.
44. “God called unto Adam . . . Hast thou eaten of the tree, whereof I commanded
thee that thou shouldest not eat?” Genesis 3:9–11.
45. “[W]hen the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that is was pleasant
to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make one wise, she took of the fruit thereof, and did
eat, and gave also unto her husband with her . . . .” Genesis 3:6.
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consumption is making. The consequences of their consumption,
calculated only by countable things, like lost leisure time in the
Garden, or hours later suffered tilling arid soil or engaged in painful
childbirth, may be the same whether their expulsion was a result of
being fooled or being foolish. But there is a subtler meaning to their
consumer experience that resides in the nature of the relationship
between producer and consumer. It is the difference between the
Snake fooling Eve into taking the apple, and Eve (merely) foolishly
giving the apple to Adam. 46
Emphasizing the meaning that abides in the social relations of
consumption compels a departure from focusing on marketing and
advertising as the oracle of consumer culture. Or, put better,
showcasing the social relations of consumption adds an important
variable to the hermeneutics of consumer culture that otherwise puts
more pressure on marketing analysis than it can effectively bear. We
cannot understand the consumer culture of the Garden only by
evaluating the words and manner deployed in saying, “try this
luscious apple.” 47 The Devil might have used razzle-dazzle. Eve may
have used sex appeal. The formal attributes of the speech can tell us
something about what the apple consumption “signified,” beyond
the crunch and sweetness of the fruit. But to more deeply
understand the meaning of the consumption, to understand the soul
that it makes and the cultural world that it creates, we must
understand also the motive and institutional role of the producer in
consort with the consumer. 48 This factor has largely been missing
from both condemning and celebratory analyses of consumer
culture, and it is what I mean to capture here. 49

46. “[T]he serpent was more subtil than any beast of the field . . . .” Genesis 3:1.
47. See supra text accompanying notes 42–46.
48. The poets of labor have made a rich tradition of showing the unsuitability of the
Garden of Eden for Adam and Eve, who, such poets insist, could only really be human
through their work. See, e.g., LOUIS UNTERMEYER, Eve Speaks, in THESE TIMES 183, 187
(1917) (“Better the long uncertainty of toil . . . Than this enforced and rotting indolence.”).
But for poets of consumerism the misery of the Garden must be the perversity of the miser,
the absurdity of allowing the apple to be wasted in eternal exchange value, a deposit of
humanity’s obedience to God’s command. Eve and Adam, one might say in a footnote,
liberated the apple from this reification, and redeemed its use value. See LIVINGSTON, AGAINST
THRIFT, supra note 20.
49. For example, a 500-page collection of riveting essays by leading cultural historians
on the emergence of consumerism, contains nothing whatsoever on corporate law or corporate
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My use of the “consumer agency problem” formulation
replicates categories of analysis used in conventional corporate
theory, because those categories have generated great insight in the
traditional approach, and might usefully be redirected. Similarly, I
use the “social relations of consumption” framework in an effort to
redeploy an important insight of Marxism, an intellectual tradition
that burns some distance from the flame of mainstream corporate
theory, but which on this issue may be similarly illuminating. Marx
used the term “social relations of production” to reference the set of
relationships in which humans become enmeshed in order to sustain
themselves. Different methods of production involve different kinds
of social relations. For example, the social relations that a subsistence
farmer must enter into in order to survive are very different from the
social relations to which a wage laborer in a mechanized factory must
submit in order to sustain herself. Marx emphasized that the social
relations of production are essential components of the way human
beings think about themselves and the world around them. 50 He
famously wrote: “It is not the consciousness of men that determines
their existence, but their social existence that determines their
consciousness.” 51 While “the social relations of production” has
proven a useful analytic tool, 52 it gives short shrift to the role of
consumption in shaping men and women’s sense of their lives. As the
contracts scholars Ian Macneil wrote in 1983, “[t]he social relations
of consumption have perhaps in the past . . . [been] largely

governance. CONSUMPTION AND THE WORLD OF GOODS (John Brewer & Roy Porter eds.,
1993). This oversight is routine in discussions of consumer culture.
50. See Mark Tushnet, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: An Interpretation of
Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1307, 1347 (1979) (internal citations
omitted) (explaining that a Marxist “social psychology . . . begins with the idea that people
interpret the material conditions of their existence in ways that make their experience coherent
and adds that the primary, though not exclusive, material conditions shaping those
interpretations are the social relations of production”) (citation omitted).
51. See KARL MARX, A CONTRIBUTION TO THE CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 21
(Maurice Dobb ed., S.W. Ryazankay trans., 1970) (1904). This assertion, if not taken too
rigidly, is entirely consistent with the claims of contemporary social psychology, which
emphasizes the often unseen influences of situation in shaping human cognition, preference
formation, and decision-making. See generally, Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situational
Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L. REV. 1 (2004)
[hereinafter Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character] (summarizing and assessing
psychological research of this sort).
52. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 50.
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dependent on the social relations of production. They have now,
however, become increasingly independent and, in the developed
world at least, perhaps a good deal more important than the material
social relations of production.” 53
The separation of production and consumption under corporate
capitalism implicates another Marxist concept that has no direct
analogy in canonical corporate law scholarship, but which may be
usefully exploited (no pun intended) in the assessment of consumer
culture, and that is the idea of “commodity fetishism.” 54 Marx
emphasized that under capitalist social relations of production, labor
becomes “alienated” from the goods that it creates. 55 Workers no
longer identify with the products of their labor (as they do under
pre-capitalist conditions), and the role and identity of labor is
invisible to the consumer of what is produced. Instead of reflecting
the labor that made them, commodities come to be conceived in
terms of their “exchange value,” that is, the amount of money they
can be sold for on the open market. To consumers, this “exchange
value” seems to exist sui generis in the commodity, like the power
presumed to be present in the amulets of reverential fetish in “the
mist-enveloped regions of the religious world.” 56
Commodity fetishism is a powerful concept, but it is typically
used to emphasize the negation of labor from the cultural
significance of commodities, rather than to affirmatively assess the
relationship of the consumer to commodities. This is a symptom of
the over-emphasis on the social relations of production, and too little
focus on consumption. Where Marxism-influenced scholars do
examine the consumer relationship to fetishized commodities, they

53. Ian R. Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal and External, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 340,
387 n.151 (1983). See also id. at 406 n.202 (“[I]n any given historical setting, the social
relations of consumption may be of more significant social effect than the social relations of
production.”). Macneil does not appear to have pursued this idea in these terms in his
subsequent voluminous writings, and his is the only use of the phrase “social relations of
consumption” in the Westlaw database of Law Reviews and Journals (compared with seventyfour hits for “the social relations of production”). Search of Westlaw database of Law Reviews
and Journals, August 4, 2015.
54. KARL MARX, 1 CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 81–96 (Ben
Fowkes trans., Penguin Classics 1992) (1867) [hereinafter MARX, CAPITAL] (explicating
“[t]he fetishism of commodities and the secret thereof”).
55. Id.
56. See MARX, CAPITAL, supra note 54, at 83.
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seem to reify the alienation Marx describes, rather than penetrating
through it. Earlier, for example, I referenced the work of James
Livingston, who celebrates consumerism as a means of liberating
commodities from fetishized exchange value status, and
personalizing their use values. 57 Analysts in this mode seem to leave it
entirely to the consumer to endow the commodity with her own
meaning, rather than construing that meaning in terms that are
suffused with the social relations of consumption in the
corporate milieu.
Instead of either condemning or celebrating consumer culture, I
am aiming to explain the role that corporate law plays in sustaining
these conflicting interpretations. Corporate capitalism may catalyze
the alienation of labor from the goods it produces, but corporate
social relations nevertheless constrain, shape, and contextualize the
meaning of the consumptive occasion. Corporate law, of course,
does not exhaustively describe the social relations of consumption in
our society. But it provides one route into a characterization that
may help explain the ambiguities of consumer culture that are at
once so familiar, and so contradictory.
IV. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AS A SOCIAL RELATION
OF CONSUMPTION
The emergence of large, publicly traded corporations in the
twentieth century reorganized capitalism in a way that minimized
the role of individual capitalists and wealthy families, and elevated
the role of professional corporate directors. 58 To solve the
shareholder agency problem, corporate law introduces a particular

57.
58.

See LIVINGSTON, AGAINST THRIFT, supra note 20, at xv.
See JAMES LIVINGSTON, PRAGMATISM AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
CULTURAL REVOLUTION, 1850–1940, at 100 (1994) (“[T]he transition from proprietary to
corporate capitalism entails the social (not the literal) death of capitalists in the same sense that
the transition from feudalism to capitalism entailed the social death of the landed nobility.”);
see also supra text accompanying notes 24–25. While executive officers and other corporate
functionaries are crucial figures in the social relations orchestrated by corporate enterprise, I
focus here on corporate directors, because this allows for narrowed and particular treatment of
the issues, and because corporate law specifies that it is the directors who ultimately bear
responsibility for corporate operations. See 8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 141(a) (“The business and
affairs of every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board
of directors.”).
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social relation between shareholders and directors. In so doing, it
also commands a particular social relation between directors and
consumers. The most widely used corporate law in the United
States, the law of Delaware, requires directors to manage their firms
solely in the interests of shareholders. 59 Directors are permitted to
deal solicitously with non-shareholders, but only where doing so is
“rationally related” to furthering the shareholder interest. 60 Workers
may be treated well if it will draw more productive workers to the
firm, quality goods may be produced in environmentally responsible
ways if doing so will attract consumers. But where the shareholder
interest is in tension with non-shareholders, the shareholder interest
must always prevail. The ambivalent meanings of our consumer
culture reflect the reality that corporations sometimes serve
shareholders by discerning and serving consumer desires, and
corporations sometimes serve shareholders by exploiting consumers.
It is not always possible, indeed, it is usually impossible, to identify
and distinguish these two kinds of profit-seeking operations just by
looking at the consumption behavior. Who can tell? 61 But there can
be no doubt that both dynamics are ubiquitous. From a corporate
law perspective, it makes no difference how the profits are made.
Good faith for the shareholders is all Delaware will say.
Corporate law’s agnosticism as to how profits are made is
obscured through the social relations of consumption which that
same law incarnates. It is obscured because corporate directors are
59. See John Armour et. al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 IND. L.J. 1345 (2012)
(giving evidence of, and summarizing explanations for, Delaware’s dominance). Some
corporate law scholars disagree with my doctrinal characterization and insist that Delaware law
provides directors with latitude to manage firms in the service of non-shareholders even where
doing so compromises shareholder interests. See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER
VALUE MYTH 95 (2012). I show why shareholder primacy really is the law of Delaware in
David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, supra note 27; see also David G. Yosifon,
Corporate Aid of Governmental Authority: History and Analysis of an Obscure Power in
Delaware Corporate Law, 10 U. ST. THOMAS. L.J. 1086 (2013) (extending this assessment).
60. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1985) (“A board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its responsibilities,
provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders.”).
61. Is smoking cool, or is it manipulative? Is junk food delicious, or pernicious? One
cannot say, in an ethically serious way, just by observing the consumption of cigarettes or junk
food. Nor, I think, can one say so from an evaluation of tobacco or fast food advertising alone.
See supra text accompanying notes 46–49.
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not snakes, and they are not devils. They are human. Modern
psychologists have confirmed what Adam Smith wrote in his Theory
of Moral Sentiments: “Man [and woman] naturally desire[], not only
to be loved, but to be lovely; or to be that thing which is the natural
and proper object of love. He naturally dreads, not only to be hated,
but to be hateful.” 62 Directors are motivated to see themselves as
serving consumers, not mulcting them. 63 They are keen to see their
corporate operations always as serving consumers, even though we
must expect that this is not, in fact, what they are always doing.
Directors avoid the dissonance that might otherwise arise in trying
to both serve their shareholders and self-affirm as “lovely,” by
patronizing overly sanguine conceits about the nature of their work.
In public settings, and no doubt in private ones too, corporate
directors routinely insist that they are committed to ensuring that
their firms operate as good corporate citizens. 64 That profit is not
their guiding light, certainly not their only one, but rather, that they
are committed to serving all of their stakeholders, including their
workers and consumers. A familiar trope involves a director
reviewing the arduous, but finally heroic, struggle their firm

62. ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 166 (Arlington House 1969)
(1759); see also Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 51, at 90–95
(reviewing social psychology research on the motive to self-affirm).
63. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 51, at 94–95
(emphasizing the self-affirmation motive at that heart of human psychology). There has been
little systematic or deep study of boards of directors as decision-making bodies as such. “The
dynamics of boardroom teams—including how each director contributes to the cognitive
output of the board as a whole—remain . . . shrouded in mystery.” The Second International
Conference on Engaged Management Scholarship, Solange Charas, Boardroom Theater: Actors,
Actions and Their Consequences 4 (2012). We do not have deep studies informing us about
how directors think or how boards make decisions. This is perhaps necessarily so, as Board
deliberations are confidential, even secretive, by their nature. The picture we sketch of this
factor in the social relations of consumption must be drawn from corporate governance law,
and fundamental insights of social psychology.
64. See David G. Yosifon, The Dalai Lama and Corporate Law, THE CORPORATE
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY PODCAST (2014) (downloaded using iTunes) (describing and
critiquing a public dialogue between directors of Silicon Valley corporations and His Holiness
the Dalai Lama on the relationship between corporate operations and compassion); see also
David G. Yosifon, Is Corporate Patriotism a Virtue?, 13 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L LAW
(forthcoming 2016) (arguing that the commands of shareholder primacy conflict with morally
legitimate imperatives of patriotic conscience, and suggesting reforms that would allow firms
to operate more patriotically).
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undertook, listening to community groups, engaging critics, and
finally ceasing the doing of some nefarious thing: dumping, bribing,
skimping, or misleading (the nefarious thing having inevitably begun
under a previous management team). 65 It always starts out as a story
about the company doing the right thing, irrespective of the cost.
But then comes the inevitable deus ex machina, wherein the director
reveals that it turned out that the socially responsible course was also
profitable for shareholders. Because it encouraged buy-in among
workers and consumers and the community. The director’s vignette
then becomes the urtext for that occasion’s discussion of socially
irresponsible corporate activity generally. The solution, plainly, is to
get corporations to perceive that the responsible thing to do is also
the profitable thing to do, just as happened in the director’s vignette.
Profit sacrifice is celebrated as no sacrifice at all, and corporate law is
vindicated as being socially responsible.
Corporate directors regularly make this claim, that there is
coherence—that there is integrity—between the interests of
shareholders and those of non-shareholders. A prominent example is
found in the book Conscious Capitalism, by John Mackey, founder,
and a director, of Whole Foods Markets, Inc. 66 Mackey, a strong
proponent of shareholder primacy in corporate governance,
65. Case studies of corporate social responsibility campaigns reveal a pattern in which
the worst offenders in a particular area relating to social responsibility are forced to confront
their misdeeds by activists and interest groups, and then ultimately become responsible
corporate leaders in the area. See Cristina A. Cedillo Torres et. al., Four Case Studies on
Corporate Social Responsibility: Do Conflicts Affect a Company’s Corporate Social Responsibility
Policy?, 8 UTRECHT L. REV. 51, 52 (2012). Some observers see this as evidence of the
effectiveness of contemporary corporate social responsibility pressures. Id. The pattern appears
to tract the aphorism attributed to Mahatma Gandhi: “First they ignore you, then they laugh
at you, then they fight you, then you win.” This may be a predictable sequence of steps for
activists in various domains. And the fact that the campaign “win[s]” in the end says
something laudable about the campaign and the campaigners. But it says nothing
commendable about the system in which the activists are operating. The fact that Gandhi was
ultimately successful in establishing Indian independence is hardly evidence that the British
imperial system was operating as well as might be hoped. Similarly, the success of activist
movements aimed at forcing socially responsible policies on corporations should not be read as
evidence of the appropriateness of the prevailing corporate governance system.
66. The book is co-authored by Raj Sisodia, a marketing professor at Bentley
University. JOHN MACKEY & RAJ SISODIA, CONSCIOUS CAPITALISM: LIBERATING THE
HEROIC SPIRIT OF BUSINESS (2013). I refer to Mackey in the text for ease of usage, and
because he is an influential director of a large, publicly traded corporation. No disrespect (nor
letting off the hook) is intended to Sisodia.
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proclaims that business is most profitable when it “consciously” cares
for non-shareholders: “In addition to creating social, cultural,
intellectual, physical, ecological, emotional, and spiritual value for all
stakeholders, conscious businesses also excel at delivering exceptional
financial performance over the long term.” 67 Mackey even predicts
that because rapacious firms are less profitable, “[e]ventually, the
marketplace will weed out businesses that aren’t sufficiently
conscious.” 68 But this is plainly wrong. While profit maximization
surely does not inevitably involve trade-offs between stakeholders, it
is also true that sometimes profits can maximize through
“insufficiently conscious” business practices. Indeed, if the weeds
can make some profits, then they are likely to persist, even if other
plants prove more profitable. Over fifty years ago, Armen Alchian
showed that firms do not need to maximize profits in order to
survive, they just need to make some profits. 69 If there is profit to be
made in exploitative conduct, and “conscious” firms decline to reap
it, the exploitative conduct will still happen. The profits will be
made, and the firms that make them will continue to do business.
Even if it were true that shareholder primacy in corporate
governance will “eventually” weed out firms that are not socially

67. Id. at 35.
68. Id. at 276–77, 289. The only support Mackey offers for his claim that firms
pursuing all stakeholder interests are more profitable than those that do not is his assertion
that there are “dozens” of high-profile, successful firms operating under the tenants of
conscious capitalism. Id. Dozens! Cf. Tobias Fünke, a fictional character in the television
comedy Arrested Development who suffers from “never nudism,” a psychological affliction
which compels him to never be fully nude, even when he showers. As the story develops,
Tobias comes to embrace his identity as a “Never Nude.” In a scene that has become an
internet “meme,” he holds forth at a Never Nude rally and bellows: “There are dozens of us.
Dozens!” The line is played for laughs, and it gets them. Mackey’s “dozens” was probably not
meant for laughs. See Arrested Development: In God We Trust (Fox television broadcast Dec.
21, 2003).
69. See Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. POL.
ECON. 211, 213 (1950) (“Realized positive profits, not maximum profits, are the mark of
success and viability. It does not matter through what process of reasoning or motivation such
success was achieved. The fact of its accomplishment is sufficient. This is the criterion by which
the economic system selects survivors: those who realize positive profits are the survivors; those
who suffer losses disappear.”); see also Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political
and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 579–80 (1990) (summarizing reasons why
markets cannot force the reform of underperforming firms, including, perhaps most
importantly, the inefficacy of markets for control, “given the ability of target managers to
impose substantial costs and risks on unwanted bidders”).
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conscious, we are still left among the weeds in our present world,
and at all times sooner than “eventually.” Shareholder primacy
apologists such as Mackey never say what kind of time-horizon they
have in mind when promising convergence of stakeholder interests in
the long-term. Is it a decade? A century? Millennia? As John
Maynard Keynes put it, “[i]n the long-run we are all dead.” 70 How
long until that fated day, when the profitability of conscious firms
will “weed out” exploitative firms? Throughout his book, Mackey
frankly acknowledges that “[i]f a business seeks only to maximize
profits to ensure shareholder value and does not attend to the health
of the entire system, short-term profits may indeed result, perhaps
lasting many years . . . .” 71 Many years may be all some people,
values, or ecosystems have left. In the shorter-term, individual
suffering, family disintegration, community collapse, and cultural
decay may beckon. Consumers suffering exploitation in their
eclipsing youth can take no comfort in the misty legend that “many
years” from now shareholder-oriented firms will figure out that
better profits are to be had by treating non-shareholders
with dignity. 72
Recently, several states, including Delaware, have adopted
“Public Benefit Corporation” statutes which create a new form of
business entity that requires directors to balance the interests of
shareholders and non-shareholders in corporate operations. 73 The
very existence of these Public Benefit Corporation statutes expresses
the law’s understanding that socially responsible operations are not

70. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TRACT ON MONETARY REFORM 80 (1923)
(emphasis omitted).
71. MACKEY & SISODIA, supra note 66, at 52 (emphasis added).
72. “Eventually” is a reservation that significantly undermines the claim that
shareholder primacy is consonant with non-shareholder interests. But the weakness of the
“eventually” gambit evades scrutiny by mis-resonating with moral attitudes that celebrate
“delayed gratification,” and criticize the hedonism of instant gratification. This illogically
makes the “long term” feature of Mackey’s argument seem more impressive, rather than less.
73. See 8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 365(a) (“The board of directors shall manage or direct
the business and affairs of the public benefit corporation in a manner that balances the
pecuniary interests of the stockholders, the best interests of those materially affected by the
corporation’s conduct, and the specific public benefit or public benefits identified in its
certificate of incorporation.”); see also David G. Yosifon, Opting Out of Shareholder Primacy: Is
the Public Benefit Corporation Trivial? (2015) (draft on file with author) (assessing ways in
which the Delaware Public Benefit Corporation statute affects how the Delaware General
Corporation Law should be interpreted).
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really always consonant with profits. The fact that corporate directors
are not rushing, or even crawling, 74 to adopt these organizational
forms is evidence that they somehow know that profits and social
responsibility are not always aligned, even if they will not
acknowledge it clearly to themselves or others. The capital markets’
failure to abandon conventional corporations to invest in forms that
ensure equal attention to non-shareholding stakeholders gives the
“acid bath of economics” to delusions that social responsibility and
shareholder profits are always the same thing. 75 But the failure to
recognize and speak the truth of stakeholder dis-alignment, and the
truth of shareholder privilege in corporate governance, obfuscates
the nature of the producer-consumer corporate relationship,
infecting consumer culture with dis-integrity and ambiguity.
74. See Alicia E. Plerhoples, Delaware Public Benefit Corporations 90 Days Out: Who’s
Opting In?, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 247, 249−50 (2014) (“Overall, very few companies have
opted into the public benefit corporation and its variations.”).
75. See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 437 (1992) (“Clear thinking . . . is
obstructed
by
layers
of . . .
ideology,
superstition,
and
prejudice
that
the acid bath of economics can help us peel away.”). Of course the new social enterprise forms
were hardly necessary to demonstrate this, since business has long had available to it standard
forms of “for-profit” corporations that are more solicitous of non-shareholding interests than
Delaware. For example, the New York statute has long stated that
(b) In taking action . . . a director shall be entitled to consider, without
limitation . . . the effects that the corporation’s actions may have in the short-term
or in the long-term upon any of the following: . . . (ii) the corporation’s current
employees . . . (iv) the corporation’s customers and creditors; and (v) the ability of
the corporation to provide, as a going concern, goods, services, employment
opportunities and employment benefits and otherwise to contribute to the
communities in which it does business.
N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717 (McKinney 2015). The reason that states like New York can get
away with this kind of non-shareholderist language is precisely because Delaware dominates so
completely in the sale of corporate charters. These states could probably not attract corporate
business even if they copied and pasted Delaware’s statute and case law into its own law.
Therefore, these states might as well enjoy whatever expressive social responsibility comes with
having multi-stakeholder language on its books. Indeed, the history behind these permissive
provisions in these states’ corporate codes is that they were developed in response to agitation
from labor groups that were panicked by the mass layoffs attendant to the wave of profitmaximizing corporate takeovers in the 1980s. Labor groups were relatively influential in these
states, and corporations were genuinely disinterested in what these states’ corporate statutes
said because they were not using them anyway, so it was relatively easy to get this multistakeholder language into these states’ laws. See generally Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical
and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579
(1992) (surveying statutes). There are no cases interpreting these permissive, multi-stakeholder
provisions, because they are not real corporate law.
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Human nature dictates that directors believe they serve
shareholders by serving consumers. And corporate law dictates that
those beliefs be formed in ignorance. Corporate law prescribes and
constrains the way that directors think and talk about corporate
decision-making. Directors have an obligation to become informed
about and to deliberate on the consequences of corporate policy for
the shareholders. 76 Directors’ minds and voices are thus actively
turned, by legal injunction, to contemplation of the shareholder
interest. At the same time, corporate law forbids directors from
giving supportive voice to policies that would aid non-shareholding
stakeholders at the expense of shareholders. 77 Square pegs of social
responsibility that cannot fit the round hole of shareholder primacy
are left unplaced in the corporate conscience. While shareholder
primacy reigns, corporate social responsibility in the boardroom is
“the love that dare not speak its name.” 78 And if it cannot speak,
then it cannot fully flourish, and cannot be contrasted with or
balanced against the one love that is normative for directors: the
shareholder interest. This limitation on directorial discourse
necessarily influences the mind, conscience, and decisions of
corporate directors. The combination of forced speaking, on behalf
of shareholders, and forbidden speaking, about non-shareholders,
gives shape to a particular kind of knowledge and practice, and
precludes others. It keeps directors thinking carefully about the
shareholder interest, and thinking only casually about nonshareholder interests. 79

76. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
77. In every reported case where directors have admitted to sacrificing shareholder
interests in favor of other stakeholder concerns, Delaware courts have found that the directors
violated their fiduciary obligations to shareholders. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (holding that directors were not permitted
to privilege creditor interests over shareholder interests in the course of selling their company,
which the directors admitted to doing); Ebay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1
(Del. Ch. 2010) (“I [Chancellor William Chandler] cannot accept as valid . . . a corporate
policy that specifically, clearly, and admittedly seeks not to maximize the economic value of a
for-profit Delaware corporation for the benefit of its stockholders . . . .”).
78. LORD ALFRED DOUGLAS, Two Loves, in THE CHAMELEON (1894).
79. The law of fiduciary duty thus engenders affective connotations between directors
and shareholders. Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Importance of Being Trusted, 81 B.U. L. REV.
591, 599 (2001). But it mutes other affective processes. Empathy is developed by projecting
one’s own thoughts and feelings about a situation onto others, who we assume must feel
things similarly to the way that we do. See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Behavioral Biology,
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By limiting the form and content of directorial deliberation,
corporate law ensures that the cognitive dissonance that might
otherwise emerge in the simultaneous pursuits of profit-maximizing
duty and self-affirmation finds instead easy harmonious resolution in
directors’ minds, and in the corporate conscience. 80 The particular
construction of this coherence is shaped by corporate governance
law, which pushes directors to devote their scarce cognitive and
emotional resources in favor of the shareholder interest. We must
suppose, at least at the margin, that the law of fiduciary duty will
push dissonance reduction in a manner that privileges the
shareholder interest, at the expense of other values.
An experiment by the social psychologist Dan Ariely captures the
kind of boardroom shading that I have in mind. Ariely and his
collaborators designed an experiment called the “Dots Test” which
put subjects before a computer screen that flashed a series of images
of squares with dots inside of them. 81 Sometimes the dots were
distributed with more to the left side of the square, and sometimes
they were distributed with more to the right. 82 For each image,
subjects were told to determine which side of the square had more
dots. The images flashed too quickly for subjects to actually count
the dots, so they were forced to make uncertain judgments. Subjects
were told they would receive one cent every time they hit the
computer key indicating more dots on the left side, and five cents
every time they hit the key indicating more dots on the right side.

the Rational Actor Model, and the New Feminist Agenda 11 (Geo. Wash. U. L. Sch. Pub. L.
and Legal Stud. Res. Paper, Series Paper No. 276, 2007), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=98448 (citing contemporary studies of empathy). Directorial loyalty
involves putting shareholders above other stakeholders, and it also involves putting
shareholders above directors themselves. For the fiduciary, “thought of self [is] to be
renounced, however hard the abnegation.” Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 548 (N.Y.
1928) (Cardozo, J.) (explaining loyalty). This suppression of the self marginalizes the
mechanism that produces empathy. This may be the secret mission of the duty of loyalty. It is
not the selfishness but rather the selflessness of the fiduciary that makes him such a danger to
others. The selfless individual is not more capable of empathy, he is less capable of it. The
fiduciary relationship intensifies one’s devotion to a particular person or group, but diminishes
one’s capacity to be concerned for others.
80. On the importance of dissonance avoidance in contemporary models of human
cognition and decision-making, see Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note
51, at 107–25 (summarizing social psychological studies).
81. See DAN ARIELY, THE (HONEST) TRUTH ABOUT DISHONESTY 126–30 (2012).
82. Id. at 127–29.
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Subjects were also told that they would not be evaluated for the
correctness of their answers. 83 Ariely summarizes his scheme: “[b]y
creating this skewed payment system, we gave the participants an
incentive to see reality in a slightly different way . . . . [T]hey were
faced with a conflict between producing an accurate answer and
maximizing their profit.” 84 Subjects then responded to two-hundred
images flashed in rapid succession.
A silly, stylized rational-actor model of human behavior would
predict that subjects would systematically hit the key indicating more
dots on the right, because their decisions were unreviewable, and five
cents is better than one cent. But as realistic models of human
decision-making predict, this is not what happened. Instead, the
experimenters found a widespread tendency towards a little bit of
cheating, and no self-conscious recognition of cheating. 85 That is,
people were biased towards the higher-paying interpretation of what
they were seeing, but they viewed themselves as making fair and
objective assessments. Of perhaps particular relevance to the
decision-making dynamics of the boards of our most powerful
corporations, Ariely found that “creative” individuals were more
prone to click on the right (higher paying) key than were other types
of people. The greatest divergence between “creative” types and the
baseline population came in squares with a small difference in the
number of dots on the left and right. The creative types were not
more prone to engage in “bold” lies, but rather, were more prone to
“lie,” to themselves and the experimenters, at the margins. Ariely
concludes: “the link between creativity and dishonesty seems related
to the ability to tell ourselves stories about how we are doing the

83. In corporate law terms, subjects were given business judgment rule protection for
their answers on the dots test. See infra notes 115–16 and accompanying text (noting that
under the “business judgment rule,” courts will not evaluate the substance of business
decisions that corporate boards make in good faith).
84. ARIELY, supra note 81, at 129.
85. Id. at 163–91. Ariely argues that there is a fundamental human tendency to be
“morally flexible” in this way (it is “hardwired,” if you must), but he emphasizes that “cultural
context” can influence the “magnitude of the fudge factor that is considered acceptable for any
particular domain.” Id. at 242. Again, by “acceptable,” he means acceptable not just to
observers, but to the liar him or herself.
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right thing, even when we are not.” 86 Governing under the
substantive and procedural dictates of shareholder primacy, directors
can privilege the shareholder interest, and short-change other
shareholders, all the while subjectively believing that their decisions
are not just profitable for shareholders, but fair to everyone involved.
Of course, it would be naïve to think that directors always
actually put their shareholders first, consciously or subconsciously.
Sometimes it seems obvious that corporate directors are ignoring the
law of corporate governance and are sacrificing corporate profits in
favor of some other value. 87 These exceptions further highlight the
dis-integrity brought on by the rule. Especially in such instances, the
law of corporate governance, with its insistence of shareholder
primacy, forces opacity, and disingenuousness into the deliberative
process in the boardroom, making it impossible to draw anything
but muddied conclusions about the meaning and significance of
corporate operations in our culture.
Consider, for example, this tale that comes out of the sub-prime
mortgage debacle. In the fall of 2008, Bank of America was poised
to buy the investment bank Merrill Lynch, which was going down in
a sea of bad debt. 88 After a merger agreement was in place between
the two firms, Merrill Lynch’s financial position worsened (from an
already dire situation). Bank of America’s board considered
abandoning the merger, which it may have had the right to do under
the standard “material adverse change” clause of the merger

86. Id. at 172. Interestingly, Ariely’s research team found no correlation between
higher or lower “intelligence” as such and the tendency to cheat in a manner that deviated
from the norm. Id. at 176.
87. Doug Baird and Todd Henderson argue that corporate directors routinely engage
in behavior that is not even arguably consistent with the idea that directors owe fiduciary
obligations exclusively to shareholders. Douglas G. Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other
People’s Money, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1309 (2008). One example they give is the practice of firms
electively filing for bankruptcy, which provides an orderly structure for dealing with creditor
claims, but extinguishes shareholder claims altogether. Id. at 1320. My claim is not that the
shareholder primacy norm precludes boards from ever engaging in socially responsible
decision-making. Rather, my view is that the shareholder primacy norm distorts the discourse
and precludes the kind of completeness in deliberation that would allow for better, more
coherent decisions.
88. See Robert J. Rhee, Fiduciary Exemption for Public Necessity: Shareholder Profit,
Public Good, and the Hobson’s Choice During a National Crisis, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV.
661 (2010).
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agreement. 89 Bank regulators within the federal government,
however, believed that a collapse of the Bank of America-Merrill
Lynch merger would devastate already staggering credit markets,
threatening to destroy the American economy (and possibly the
global economy). 90 That is, regulators were concerned that a
privately useful decision by Bank of America’s board might be
socially irresponsible. This the regulators communicated to the
directors. Also, the regulators communicated that if the board
insisted on exercising its right to terminate the merger, the
government might feel compelled to exercise its power under federal
banking regulations to remove the incumbent members of the Bank
of America board, in the public interest. 91
Lo and behold, upon further deliberation, the Bank of America
directors decided they would, after all, go ahead with the merger. 92
In his engaging review of this episode, Professor Robert Rhee
concludes that the directors were obviously influenced by the
regulators’ threat to replace the board, and it seems likely that the
directors were also genuinely concerned about the pressing social
interests at stake in their decision. 93 However clear this is, it is even
clearer that the social responsibility implicated in their decision
played no part in the explicit deliberation of the board. The minutes
reflect that the board concluded the decision was in the shareholder
interest. 94 The statements of individual board members testifying
before Congress reflect the same. Those minutes and that testimony
were entirely predictable. They could have been written by anyone
familiar with the board’s decision, but unfamiliar with the board’s
deliberation. This is because any other explanation of the decision
would have been a confession that the directors had violated their
fiduciary obligations to their shareholders. And yet the statements
appear to be entirely unbelievable (except, perhaps, to the board
members themselves). At best, our highest-level corporate discourse

89. See id. at 669–72.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. Id. at 684 (“The board minutes plainly state that the government’s threat did not
influence the board members, though such self-serving notice, by itself, cannot be
taken seriously.”).
94. See id.
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about this pressing social crisis was had through winks and nods,
dumb and indecorous innuendo. In this way our corporate law
creates corporate speech on corporate social responsibility that is at
once entirely predictable, totally unbelievable, and utterly useless.
A critical (realistic) observer of the Bank of America-Merrill
Lynch transaction is forced into incredulity or cynical amusement
reading the directors’ assertions that the decision to proceed with
the merger was made because they decided it was in the
shareholders’ interest. 95 Always our discourse on corporate
operations must be subsumed within this clouded mindset. It is
corporate law, through the shareholder primacy norm, which keeps
our corporate directors from talking openly and honestly about what
is at stake and what should wisely be done about it. It is corporate
law that imposes this cynicism on our conversations about what
corporations are and what they are doing. The shareholder primacy
norm in corporate governance creates the perverse situation in which
serious assessment of corporate decision-making relating to socially
pressing matters must begin by discounting the actual deliberations
by directors making the decision.
Rhee, reflecting a general consensus among corporate law
scholars, writes that “[t]hese elisions are the white lies of corporate
law, not malicious or mendacious, but perhaps necessary to maintain
a proper decorum of law and policy.” 96 But if these lies are necessary
to maintain a proper decorum in the very domain where law and
policy most explicitly condemns lying (“[n]ot honesty alone, but the
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard”),97
perhaps the decorum is masking something indecorous in law and
policy. If we cannot trust that what is said in the boardroom is the
real story, then how can we make sense of the corporate decisions
that come out of them? What kind of meaning, other than a
confused and indeterminate one, can we take from corporate
conduct? Our current corporate governance law, together with
attendant theory, norms, and ethics, practically requires, and
certainly encourages, this kind of insincerity. This breeds cynicism

95. See id. at 672.
96. Id. at 698.
97. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (providing a classic
exposition of the meaning of fiduciary obligation).
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and skepticism, which become core features of corporate capitalism’s
consumer culture.
V. PRESCRIPTIVE INTEGRITY IN CORPORATE LAW AND
CONSUMER CULTURE
Nobody wants to return to the “penurious self-sufficiency of the
household system,” 98 much less the dreary, limited cultural life it
contained. 99 Corporate law critics should recognize, respect, and help
advance the transcendent power of consumerism. Reformers seeking
to constrain the exploitative aspects of consumerism must eschew
prescriptions that threaten to cripple the efficient production of
goods and services that the corporate form provides. Critics must
pursue their progressive aims without getting trapped in the role of
the joyless scold who seeks to censor consumer marketing that
deploys sex, humor, or whimsy in “misleading” ways. 100 The
challenge is to find a way to improve upon the quality of consumer
culture without limiting its creativity and freedom.
Some corporate critics seek to do more than censor. Sonya Katyal
explores the emergence of (what she calls) “semiotic disobedience”
as a response to the corporate control of cultural meaning.101
“Semiotic disobedience” is the practice of disrupting and reappropriating corporate control of social meaning through “culture

98. See ROBERTSON, supra note 37, at 104.
99. Of course some people and sub-cultures in our society do choose a life of material
privation and self-sufficiency. See, e.g., SCOTT DANNEMILLER, THE YEAR WITHOUT A
PURCHASE (2015) (memoir of a family’s experiment of dropping out of consumer culture).
But the meaning of such a life is very different when it is chosen than when it is the only
option society contains.
100. See, e.g., my own earlier proposal to address the obesity epidemic by prescribing a
“tombstone” advertising regime for junk-food products, which would limit advertising of such
goods to black lettering on white background, describing in simple, precise terms the item
offered, its ingredients, price, and place of provision, in David G. Yosifon, Resisting Deep
Capture: The Commercial Speech Doctrine and Junk-Food Advertising to Children, 39 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 507 (2006) [hereinafter Yosifon, Resisting Deep Capture].
101. Sonia K. Katyal, Semiotic Disobedience, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 489, 489–90 (2006).
Katyal’s phrase references the idea of “semiotic democracy” developed by the media studies
scholar, John Fiske. “[S]emiotic democracy” stands for the proposition that language, symbols,
and all manner of commercial expression are subject to reinterpretation by recipients of such
expression, in ways that may dramatically alter the speakers’ intended meaning. Id. (citing
Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81
CAL. L. REV. 125, 139 (1993)).
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jamming” activities, including unauthorized use of intellectual
property to convey anti-corporate personal or political messages. 102
Semiotic disobedience treats as a scarce resource the physical
embodiments of expression, especially in the public sphere, and its
attitude laudably recognizes the limited cognitive capacity of
speakers and listeners, which traditional First Amendment discourse
has been loath to address. This is culture jamming, not one more
contribution to an imagined free-flowing river of meaning. 103
But “semiotic disobedience” is no way to run a country. Its
proponents, and other corporate antagonists ranging from the Tea
Party members to activists in the Occupy movement, speak in
desperate terms about the role of corporations in our society, terms
that I fear increasingly resonate with widening swaths of Americans.
I am looking for a constructive way of responding to this
desperation. A thoughtful, peaceful, deliberative approach to
renegotiating the meaning of consumer culture might better take
place through the reform of corporate governance law.
Many academic proponents of shareholder primacy in corporate
governance acknowledge that their preferred regime creates an
incentive for firms to overreach in dealing with potentially vulnerable
stakeholders, such as workers or consumers. 104 However, shareholder
primacists insist that this problem should be addressed through
reliance on external governmental regulation aimed at containing
these kinds of abuses, such as labor laws, and consumer protection
statutes, rather than reform of corporate governance law.
Government regulation of that sort, they insist, will force
shareholder-primacy firms to pursue profits in non-exploitative ways.
In previous work, I have argued that this external “general
welfare legislation” response to the consumer agency problem does
not add up, even on the canonical account’s own terms.105

102. See generally id.
103. See Yosifon, Resisting Deep Capture, supra note 100, at 599–601 (insisting that
First Amendment theory must fully grapple with a fundamental problem that it too often
refuses to acknowledge: the cognitive and temporal limitations on human speech
and listening).
104. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 5, at 68–72 (insisting that corporate exploitation
of non-shareholders should be cured by external regulation, not corporate governance law).
105. See, e.g., David G. Yosifon, The Public Choice Problem in Corporate Law: Corporate
Social Responsibility After Citizens United, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1197 (2011).
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Corporations seek profits for shareholders not only in “markets,” but
also in the legislative arena, by working to stunt the development of
the “general welfare legislation” that shareholder primacists insist is
necessary to constrain the corporate overreach they acknowledge is
endemic to their system. The logic of collective action suggests that
corporations—relatively small in number, focused in purpose, led by
talented professionals—will routinely prevail over widely dispersed
workers, consumers, environmentalists, and communities, in the
competition for regulatory favor. 106 This problem has been ossified
by the ruling in Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission,107
which specifies that corporations have a First Amendment right to
operate in the political domain. 108 Indeed, if it is true that consumer
culture depoliticizes individual and collective understanding of the
human predicament, then that would pose an additional challenge to
the canonical account of shareholder primacy, which presupposes a
robust political dynamic that can generate a regulatory regime
capable of constraining the externalizing tendencies of shareholder
primacy in corporate operations. 109
I urge a reformative program that alters the social relations of
consumption. The reform I have in mind would require directors to
sincerely consider the impact of corporate decision-making on
multiple stakeholders, not simply shareholders. This sincerity gambit
would regulate the way that corporate law requires directors to speak
about and to consumers. 110 It does not compel or forbid speech on
particular subjects, nor does it specify the form or content of speech.
It regulates the deliberative process through which corporate speech
is generated, and it sets new default rules for what kind of speech

106.
107.
108.

See generally Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 51.
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
See also David G. Yosifon, Consumer Lock-In and the Theory of the Firm, 35
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1429, 1449 (2012) [hereinafter Yosifon, Consumer Lock-in and the Theory
of the Firm] (“So long as Citizens United is good constitutional law, shareholder primacy is bad
corporate theory.”); David G. Yosifon, The Citizens United Gambit in Corporate Theory: A
Reply to Bainbridge on Strine & Walker (Santa Clara Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 414, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2510967 (responding to
Bainbridge’s claims that Citizens United does not raise doubts about the legitimacy of
shareholder primacy theory).
109. See supra text accompanying notes 10−17.
110. See Yosifon, Consumer Lock-in and the Theory of the Firm, supra note 108, at 1429.
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different actors in the corporate nexus are entitled to. 111 It is a way of
getting corporate boards to discuss more openly and honestly what
their firms are doing. By reforming corporate governance in this way,
the law can help consumer culture be more honest. It can give
consumer culture more integrity. 112
Directors would still be charged with pursuing profits for
shareholders. To till the arid soil, and make beautiful electronics, we
must use the productive capacity of aggregated capital and
centralized decision-making that the corporate form provides.
Without a credible promise of profits, capital will be no more willing
to participate in corporate operations than would consumers without
consumption or labor without wages. As an initial guiding principle,
the law should instruct corporate directors to seek profits for
shareholders. But that principle should be circumscribed by an
obligation to actively, honestly, and sincerely undertake that pursuit
in a way that is mindful of the interests of non-shareholding
stakeholders in corporate operations. The law should require this
reflection, then give directors wide latitude in allowing the reflection
to shape corporate decisions. 113
This is an attempt to influence meaning by orienting motive,
without controlling content. It avoids the narrowness and blandness,
the cold social and cultural life, prescribed by a discursive regime
focused on truth and falsity. We must have sincerity, clarity, and
straightforwardness at the core of the consumer relationship with the
firm, so that we can with confidence enjoy the play and exploration
occasioned by looser speech at the periphery. As Jeffrey Lipshaw
111. See David G. Yosifon, Discourse Norms as Default Rules: Structuring Corporate
Speech to Multiple Stakeholders, 21 HEALTH MATRIX: J. OF L. MED. 189 (2011).
112. See Werner H. Erhard, Michael C. Jensen, & Steve Zaffron, Integrity: A Positive
Model that Incorporates the Normative Phenomena of Morality, Ethics, and Legality (Harvard
Business School NOM Unit Working Paper No. 06–11, 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1542759 (developing an approach to “integrity” that the authors
argue will result in more substantial improvement in corporate operations than has been
accomplished by Jensen’s work on the agency problem).
113. A reform of this sort would require federalizing corporate chartering in the United
States, or at least a much deeper federal preemption of state corporate governance standards
than is presently seen under the federal securities laws. If Delaware were to give up
shareholder primacy (unthinkable) then another state would quickly offer it, given that states
can internalize the benefits of charter-sales to their own coffers, while externalizing the costs of
corporate over-reach to other states or countries. While states charter corporations,
shareholder primacy will continue to dominate American consumer culture.
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notes, “it is not morally wrong to tell a bride [or groom] the white
lie that she [or he] is beautiful even when she [or he] is not.” 114 The
meaning of the speech, whether it is a lie, puffery, or whimsy, turns
on the purpose of the speaker. In the corporate context, we can
change the purpose of the speech, and thus its meaning, without
constraining its creativity.
A multi-stakeholder corporate governance regime could be
institutionalized through the same light-handed but psychologically
sophisticated mechanisms through which corporate law presently
imposes its shareholder primacy rule. Adhering to the “business
judgment rule,” courts do not second-guess the substance of
business decisions that boards make. 115 What courts require is that
decisions are informed and deliberate. This implies a responsibility to
listen and to speak. Self-affirmation and dissonance avoidance
motives push us to conform our beliefs to our behavior, including
our speech. Note the counter-intuitive order here—it is a crucial
insight of contemporary psychology. Sometimes we speak without
thinking very much, or speak to serve some external goal or satisfy
some external charge, and then we become concerned with making
our thinking correspond with our speech. 116 Studies have shown the
ease with which this can happen, even when there is an obvious
external stimulant or inducement to our speech. 117 Requiring
directors to express an obligation to multiple stakeholders can stoke
within them such a commitment. The corporate soul is already
made through this kind of confessional discourse, and it can be
remade that way:
[T]he agency of domination does not reside in the one who speaks
[the director] (for it is he who is constrained), but in the one who
listens and says nothing [the law, the beneficiary] . . . . And this

114. Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Of Fine Lines, Blunt Instruments, and Half-Truths: Business
Acquisition Agreements and the Right to Lie, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 431, 457 n.124 (citing
Jonathan Sacks, The White Lie, in COVENANT AND CONVERSATION: THOUGHTS ON THE
WEEKLY PARSHA FROM THE CHIEF RABBI (Dec. 25, 2004), http://www.chiefrabbi.org/
thoughts/vayechi5765.pdf.).
115. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 5, at 106–29 (explaining and justifying the business
judgment rule).
116. See Hanson & Yosifon, The Situational Character, supra note 51, at 107–11
(reviewing studies).
117. See id. (reviewing studies).
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discourse of truth finally takes effect, not in the one who receives it,
but in the one from whom it is wrested. 118

The new Public Benefit Corporation statutes do not provide any
redress to non-shareholders for corporate governance failures.
Delaware, not famous for lucidity in its statutory drafting, took
unusual pains to be clear on this point: “A director of a public
benefit corporation shall not . . . have any duty to any person on
account of any interest of such person in the public benefit or public
benefits identified in the certificate of incorporation . . . .” 119 My
approach does not envision much enforcement by consumers, or
other constituencies, in a multi-stakeholder corporate governance
regime, but it envisions more than nothing. Under a multistakeholder regime, directors would have a duty to become informed
and deliberate on the impact of corporate decisions on multiple
stakeholders. If that obligation were met, courts would not secondguess directors’ choices. However, under prevailing law, if directors
do not satisfy their process obligations in good faith, they lose
business judgment rule protection and have the burden of
demonstrating that their decisions were entirely fair to the
corporation and its shareholders. Similarly, in the reform I imagine,
directors who fail to engage in a good faith deliberative process in
corporate decision-making would expose themselves to liability
unless they could demonstrate that the decision was fair to all
stakeholders involved. 120
Different institutional details could be worked out through this
basic framework. Beneath a certain size of operations, it may be

118. 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 62
(Random House 1990) (1978). Or, if you will not have the Foucault, see Lawrence Mitchell
making the same point with a lawyer’s clarity: “[t]o understand the importance of being
trusted is to understand the way in which the responsibility for trust reposed can affect
character. It can create virtue where little had previously existed.” Lawrence E. Mitchell, The
Importance of Being Trusted, 81 B.U. L. REV. 591, 599 (2001).
119. 8 DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 365(b) (emphasis added).
120. Within a multi-stakeholder governance regime it will have to be acknowledged that
different stakeholder interests will sometimes be in tension. Directors will at times be forced to
make hard choices. We can be confident that they will be able to make hard choices between
competing interests, because they already do this all the time even under the shareholder
primacy norm, for example, with respect to shareholders with competing risk tolerances, or
time-horizon preferences. Directors are able to manage these conflicting interests presently
because the substance of their decisions is non-reviewable.
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desirable to maintain a shareholder primacy default, in order not to
lose the catalytic power of the entrepreneurial incentive. This
suggestion apes existing federal regulatory practices, which only
apply to corporate operations that have become large enough to be
economically and socially relevant on a national scale. 121 Even once
the multi-stakeholder governance threshold is reached, it still need
only be a default, one from which corporations can opt out of
through engagement with extra-market processes, such as a vote by
non-shareholding stakeholders who have “backed into” a fiduciary
treatment by the firm. Through such mechanisms a multistakeholder firm could turn to governance on behalf of only its
shareholders, its workers, or its consumers. Of primary importance in
the design of business organizations is not whether governance rules
are mandatory or mutable. What is crucial is what the default rule
will be. 122
VI. CONCLUSION
Consumer culture is a part of our culture. It is one of the
important ways that individual and social meaning is made,
negotiated, and contested, in modern society. It operates alongside
other important cultures and sub-cultures, but it indisputably is a
part of how we live now. This is why it is nostalgic, per the Franzen
epigraph at the start of this Article, 123 to ignore it. Policymakers,
scholars, artists—people concerned with critically assessing the
human condition—set themselves too small a project if they pass
over consumer culture.
Where consumer culture is not ignored, two interpretations
echo, never far from each other, in the interpretive landscape.

121. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS 155–63 (2012) (describing market capitalization thresholds that determine
when firms become subject to governance regulations under the Sarbanes-Oxley and DoddFrank reforms).
122. See Yosifon, supra note 73. It is a common mistake to draw from Ronald Coase’s
famous article, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960), the lesson that default
rules are irrelevant so long as parties subject to them are allowed to bargain to a more desirable
result. Coase himself emphasized that the main insight of his article was that transaction costs
are often prohibitively high, and, therefore, getting the default right as a matter of social policy
is crucially important.
123. See supra text accompanying note 2.
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Consumerism is demeaning and exploitative. Consumerism is
satisfying and liberating. Those who only celebrate it seem naïve, but
those who only condemn it lose us in their pretension. Doubtless
there is an element of truth to both perspectives. Yet this stark
ambivalence suggests a confusion at the core of our thinking about
consumer culture. This confusion can be traced to a lack of integrity
in the social relations of consumption. I have suggested that at its
core, consumption under corporate capitalism must be understood
through the same “agency problem” framework that has guided
corporate theory’s rich understanding of the shareholder’s
predicament in our society. The separation of production and
consumption makes the nature of the relationship between producer
and consumer a principle part of the meaning of consumer culture.
The law of corporate governance, led by the corporate law of
Delaware, takes this theoretical problem and makes it live in the
world. Shareholder primacy in corporate governance law, as it
operates through human corporate directors, it gives rise to a
corporate relationship with consumers that is confused, confusing,
and undesirable. Prevailing corporate governance law encourages
firms to deal with consumers in an insincere way, and contributes to
a consumer culture that lacks integrity.
The social relations of production under simple, affective kin and
community relations cannot (are unlikely to) produce a consumer
culture that is transcendent and deeply liberating. The separation of
production and consumption creates the efficiencies and attenuation
that are more likely to endow a liberating, pluralistic, experimental
type of consumer culture. That consumer culture, however, will
always be haunted by the consumer agency problem so long as
production and consumption is undertaken under the shareholder
primacy norm. There will always be, must always be, a suspicion that
consumer culture is inauthentic, that it lacks integrity, that there is
manipulation in it. Consumer culture under corporate capitalism
must then always remain fundamentally ambivalent, or ambiguous,
constraining its creative and liberating power.
I have suggested a reform program that would require directors
of large corporations to actively attend, openly and honestly, to the
interests of multiple stakeholders, including shareholders, workers,
and consumers, at the level of firm governance. This is an
“orienting” approach to improving the quality of consumer culture,
one that avoids the cultural desert of the censor, even as it ushers in a
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more sincere system of meaning in consumer culture. The
“Keynesian consensus” in modern policymaking presumes “more
consumption is the key to balanced growth in the future.” 124 Before
we can embark on this consumption and enjoy that growth in good
conscience, we must have some faith and confidence in what it
means to consume in the corporate system.
The social relations of consumption are but one aspect of the
meaning of consumer culture. They explain only a part of the
mystery of consumption. Endowing these social relations with
greater integrity will not give us final answers about the value and
meaning of consumerism. We will still be left with the deeper
questions: is simplicity or complexity in consumption the better
route to personal happiness and social justice? Does the quickness
with which we become bored with a particular consumer delight,
and start looking for a new one, reflect superficiality in us, or does it
reflect well on our unquenchable curiosity, showing that the world is
always short of us, that we are always grasping beyond it? Should we
buy now or save for later? Can we develop, as has been sought from
Aristotle to Norman O. Brown, “a science of human nature, able to
distinguish real human needs from (neurotic) consumer
demands”?125 Reforming corporate governance law will not answer
these questions for us. But it may help us finally get to these
questions, free from the confusions attendant to disjointed social
relations of consumption.

124.
125.
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